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By relating the exterior-interior model of body boundary awareness to Lakoff & 
Johnson’s (1999) in-out orientation of container-schematic conceptualisations, this 
study aims to explore the use of container-schematic imagery in the autobiographical 
memories of High and Low Barrier Personalities. The results of this study are based 
on a corpus of everyday autobiographical memories (N=488) and dream memories 
(N=450). The results demonstrated that, in both memory types, High Barrier 
personalities used more semantic fields representing concrete and metaphorical 
container-schematic imagery (Johnson, 1987), suggesting that the container schema is 
similar to the Barrier personality construct. The results are also discussed in reference 




“Just wear the damned mask” (Bloomberg, 2020) 
 
“McDonald’s slammed for separating Golden Arches to promote social distancing”  
(New York Post, 2020) 
 
The negotiation, erection and fall of national and cultural borders is prevalent in 
political discourses. Barriers separate people, whereas opening barriers unifies people 
and regions. There are many examples of regions that have aimed to redefine 
geographical or cultural identities by the reinforcement or creation of barriers. Recent 
examples include U.S. president Donald Trump’s suggestion of expanding the 
Mexico–United States barrier, the Catalan declaration of independence from Spain, 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), and the 
Scottish referendum. Other examples include the closing of national borders and the 
implementation of social distancing to prevent the spread of the Coronavirus, to 
mention a few.   
 
Typically, boundaries have been explored in political discourses in reference to right-
wing political influences and ideologies, such as hate crime and racist-related 
discourses (e.g., Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery, 2013; Wodak, 2009; Wodak & 
                                                
1	Correspondence	 concerning	 this	 article	 should	 be	 addressed	 to	 Dr.	 Laura	 A.	
Cariola,	 Department	 of	 Clinical	 Psychology,	 School	 of	 Health	 in	 Social	 Science,	








Richardson, 2012) and discourses of political boundaries and border politics (Chilton, 
1996). In particular, the link between cultural and bodily boundaries is a common 
metaphorical blend in Nazi and War propaganda using the BODY AS A 
CONTAINER or BODY AS A STATE metaphorical schema. In these metaphorical 
blends, the containment functions as a protective device to keep the ‘good’ self safe 
on the inside by warding off the danger of the “other” that resides beyond the 
containing boundaries (Chilton, 2005). Whereas linguistics focuses on the 
metaphorical concepts of the BODY AS A CONTAINER, psychological research has 
focussed on exploring how individuals vary in the way they experience the containing 
function of their body image, or schema. Fisher and Cleveland’s (1956, 1958) body 
boundary scoring provides a content analysis measure to explore lexical items 
associated with boundaries and their penetrability. Fisher and Cleveland’s (1956, 
1958) body image boundary concept originated from their observation that individuals 
varied in their appraisals of their own body images. A series of exploratory studies 
provided empirical evidence that a distinction could be made between individuals 
who perceive their body boundaries as being clearly bounded and differentiated from 
the environment, and individuals whose bodies lack such firm body boundaries. 
Based on these preliminary results, Fisher and Cleveland developed a reliable and 
valid body boundary scoring measure, which determines the perceived definiteness 
and permeability of one’s body. 
 
Barrier imagery measures the definiteness of body boundaries by emphasising the 
protective, enclosing, decorative, or concealing features of the boundaries of a definite 
structure, substance, or surface; for example, barrier responses include ‘a striped 
zebra’, ‘a woman wearing a high-necked dress’ and ‘a tower with stone walls’. 
Penetration imagery, in contrast, relates to the fragility, permeability, openness, and 
destruction of definite boundaries. For example, penetration responses include ‘a man 
climbing through a window’, ‘an amputated arm’ and ‘a bleeding leg’. Based on this 
scoring, high frequencies of boundary imagery indicate a High Barrier personality, 
whereas low frequencies of barrier imagery relate to a Low Barrier personality. 
Barrier and penetration imagery represent personality states that are context 
dependent (Cariola, 2014a).  
 
Psychological research has extensively explored the body boundary concept (Fisher & 
Cleveland 1958; see also Fisher, 1970, 1986). In particular, it has been identified that 
High Barrier personalities are more independent, goal-oriented, persistence-and 
achievement-oriented, emotionally expressive, and spontaneous, less suggestible and 
less likely to be disturbed in stressful and frustrating situations. High Barrier 
personalities are also more likely to support group goals and to strive to achieve group 
cohesion, as well as indicating a greater interest in socialising and communicating 
with others. It has also been shown that High Barrier personalities reflect increased 
skin sensitivity and reduced heart rate associated with greater openness and receptivity 
to externally derived stimuli, compared to individuals with Low Barrier personalities, 
who indicate the reverse pattern. In contrast, Low Barrier personalities express 
heightened concern for the safety and security of places, as a means of reinforcing 
their weak boundaries. Low Barrier personalities further reflect a greater need to 
engage in solitary activities that reduce social contact (see Fisher, 1970).  
 
Empirical research has also identified a relationship between body boundary 
awareness and primordial thought, by measuring body boundary imagery and 
 




regressive language in personal memories (Cariola, 2014a,b; see also Martindale, 
1975). The findings provided some supporting evidence for the Freudian theory that 
assumes that the body, unconscious thought and language represent interrelated 
concepts. Primordial thought relates to the Freudian (1900) theory which 
differentiates between two types of mental functioning: primary process (primordial 
thought); and secondary process (conceptual thought). According to Freudian 
psychodynamic theory (1900), the primary process is concrete, irrational, free-
associative, autistic, unrelated to logic and spatio-temporal constraints, and free from 
social and moral conventions. Primary process thought is the principal awareness that 
young children have, and it has also been associated with the cognitive functioning of 
altered states of consciousness, including dream, meditative, mystical and drug-
induced hallucinatory states (see also Martindale, 1979). The primary process is 
assumed to function in relation to the Freudian principles of displacement and 
condensation. In contrast, secondary process relates to abstract principles of grammar 
and logic, time and space, social conventions and general knowledge of typical 
everyday situations in older children and adults.  
 
Similarly, Robbins (2011, pp. 53-54) stated that primordial mental activity represents 
a distinctive form of mental activity that interacts with thought processes. In this 
view, primordial mental activity is assumed to be psychosomatic and motivated by 
bodily sensations and sensory perceptions, as well as by unprocessed raw emotions 
and an inability to accept reality. Experiences are holistic, fragments are combined 
into isomorphic entities, and personal narratives are fragmented and only relate 
vaguely to time, logic and causality. Communication is concrete and lacks self-
reflective functioning in relation to a self that is perceived as undifferentiated relative 
to others and the environment. In contrast, conceptual thought is reflective and is 
motivated to identify emotions and to adapt to reality. Experiences are self-referential, 
and personal narratives are coherent, as well as reflective of integrated thought and 
emotions that obey time and causality. Communication is self-reflective and 
symbolic, and the self is perceived as separated and individuated relative to others. 
Importantly, psychological research has provided consistent evidence of the existence 
of the Freudian primary and secondary process in human cognitive functioning 
(Brakel & Shevrin, 2005; Brakel, Shevrin, & Villa, 2002). Neurological research has 
also established a biological basis for the primary and secondary process (Carhart-
Harris & Friston, 2010).  
The Exterior-Interior Model of Body Boundary Awareness 
Fisher and Cleveland’s body boundary concept of personality has identified the 
psycho-physiological and autonomic features associated with the degree of body 
boundary finiteness. The body boundary concept of personality originates from Fisher 
and Cleveland’s (1958) qualitative observation that patients with rheumatic arthritis 
had marked concerns, expressed as fantasies and wishes, related to their bodies. This 
observation was also evidenced by their unusual number of unique Rorschach 
responses emphasising the containing, protective and surface-related features of the 
presented inkblot pictures — for example “cave with rocky walls”, “flower pot”, or 
“turtle with a shell”. These observations and initial findings were first confirmed in 
their empirical study that showed individuals who presented with chronic illnesses of 
their exterior body parts (i.e., rheumatoid arthritis, neurodermatitis and conversion 
symptoms) had higher barrier scores compared to individuals with disorders of their 
 




interior body parts (i.e., stomach disturbances and ulcerative colitis).  
Such an exterior-interior model of body boundary awareness has been explored 
further by empirical research studies. For example, individuals with definite body 
boundaries have been shown to have a high reactivity in their muscles and skin but a 
low reactivity in their interior bodily sites (i.e., heart rate) compared to individuals 
with less definite body boundaries. Another study showed that individuals with 
exterior bodily symptoms (i.e., arthritis) had a higher Galvanic Skin Response and 
showed less of an increase in heart rate in response to stressful exposures than 
individuals with interior bodily symptoms (i.e., duodenal ulcers; Fisher & Cleveland, 
1960). Children with rheumatoid arthritis also had higher barrier scores than children 
with asthma (Cleveland, Reitman, & Brewer, 1965), and a study comparing 
individuals with hypochondriac complaints related to their external bodies (e.g., skin 
itchy, joint aches) had higher barrier scores than individuals with interior complaints 
(e.g., heart throbs, stomach aches). Based on these results, Fisher (1970) concluded 
that individuals with definite body boundaries have a propensity to develop 
psychosomatic disorders in the exterior parts of the body, whereas individuals with 
indefinite body boundaries tend to develop psychosomatic disorders related to the 
interior body parts.  
 
In addition, an extensive study by Fisher and Fisher (1964) demonstrated a consistent 
relationship between high barrier scores and an external orientation of bodily 
experiences. For example, verbal reports of bodily sensations related to exterior sites 
of the body (e.g., skin, muscle) were positively correlated with barrier scores, more so 
than interior body sensations (e.g., heart, stomach). In another experiment, barrier 
scores were positively correlated with recall of word clusters related to exterior bodily 
sensations (e.g., “skin cold”) compared with interior bodily sensations (e.g., 
“heartbeat”). A study by Cassell (1966) confirmed these results, demonstrating that 
individuals using more barrier imagery recognised pictures of exterior bodily parts 
(e.g., finger, forehead) more quickly than pictures of interior bodily regions (e.g., 
heart, stomach). Fisher & Renike (1966) also demonstrated that individuals who were 
asked to focus their awareness on their exterior body sensation showed an increase in 
the use of barrier imagery during projective responses compared to a control group. 
Some studies, however, were unable to replicate the exterior-interior model explained 
by Fisher (1970) in relation to possible methodological problems, such as erroneous 
participant recruitment, irregularities of the body boundary imagery scoring and 
inaccuracies of the symptoms’ exterior-interior classification (e.g., Sherick, 1964; 
Eigenbrode & Shipman, 1960; Barendregt, 1961). 
The Body and the Container in Embodied Cognition 
Formal models of human cognition and consciousness consider the human brain to be 
a referential system that coordinates sense impressions (e.g., our visual and auditory 
attention and kinaesthetic senses) sourced from the external environment and internal 
motivations; recurrent, temporary and reflexive behaviours, including verbal 
behaviours, which represent the responses corresponding to the referential system 
(Wang et al., 2013). This view is consistent and complementary with Johnson’s 
(1987) cognitive linguistics theory. The latter suggests that image schemas are 
continuous and analogous structures that organise our mental representations, 
cognitive processes and generalised knowledge, enabling us to understand our 
physical world. These image schemas are embodied to the extent that they are realised 
 




in our ability to visually observe our environment, to move our bodies through space 
and to manipulate objects. Johnson (1987) conceptualises image schemas as pre-
conceptual and dynamical structuring processes of general sensory perceptions, bodily 
experiences and activities. For example, image schemas can be used to structure and 
organise various elements of non-spatial situations and events through the use of 
spatial prepositions (e.g., “The light is out”).  
 
One of the most basic image schemas that embodies our bodily experience is the 
container schema, which is related to the spatial and temporal structure of physical 
containment and boundedness, expressed for example by the English preposition ‘in’ 
(e.g., “The cat is in the house”) (see Figure 1). The gestalt structure of the container 
schema is made up of an inside, an outside and a boundary (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
According to Johnson (1987; see also Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), human beings are 
predisposed to experience their bodies as being physically contained and bounded by 
an enveloping skin boundary. This in-out orientation of our bodily experience is 
apparent in our cognitive perception of the environment as a three-dimensional 
container. In fact, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that the container schema is the 
most pervasive cognitive schema because of the human instinct for marking off 
territories by defining clear boundaries, such as walls and fences. Territorial 
behaviours enable humans to quantify their properties based on the spatial size 
contained within a bounded space. Common conceptualisations of the container 
schemas are multi-modal and therefore occur in relation to various contexts and event 
states (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). For example, visual attention is defined as a 
bounded visual field (e.g., “Peter has him in sight”), whereas ontological metaphors 
relate to actions and activities (e.g., “Mary ran out of energy”), as well as emotional 
states (e.g., “Peter fell in love”) that are conceptualised as definite and bounded 
spaces.   
 
As noted by Johnson (1987), the in-out orientation of the containment schema adheres 
to five structural entailments: i) containments involve protection from or resistance to 
external forces, ii) containment limits forces within the container, iii) the contained 
object is fixed to a location, iv) the fixed object is visible or invisible to an observer, 
and v) containment is transitive to the extent that if B is in A, and if C is in B, C is 



















Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT) 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) states that embodied image schemas represent 
the basis of conceptual metaphorical expressions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The 
Oxford English Dictionary  (2012) defines a metaphor as “a figure of speech in which 
a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different 
from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable”. The idea of something 
signifying something else captures the essence of the “A is B” schema of conceptual 
metaphor, which “consists of two conceptual domains, in which one domain is 
understood in terms of the other” (Kövecses, 2010, p. 4). For example, the 
metaphorical expression “beaming with joy” organises the experience of a highly 
positive emotional state (conceptual domain A) in terms of a ray or shaft of light 
(conceptual domain B). In this sense, the conceptual domain (A) represents the source 
domain (in this case HAPPINESS), which is then mapped onto the conceptual domain 
(B), the target domain, (in this case LIGHT), giving rise to the conceptual mnemonic 
of the mapping as HAPPINESS IS LIGHT (Kövecses, 2010, p. 97). Whereas the “A 
is B schema” of conceptual metaphor connects unrelated domains, metonymy, 
however, relies on a different mental mapping (Gibbs & Colston, 2012).  
 
CMT also suggests that the correspondence between source and target domains in the 
construction of the conventional metaphors that occur in everyday English 
expressions are not random occurrences or poetic instances. Instead, CMT holds that 
embodied image schemas are active in the systematic regulation of the mapping 
mechanisms between source and target domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). It is 
therefore assumed that the schematic mappings of conceptual metaphors reveal our 
thought patterns, providing insight into the cognitive processes that structure our 
bodily experiences and general knowledge. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) argue 
that many conventional metaphors are based on schematic concepts that are relevant 
to our sensorimotor experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). These image 
schemas often constitute related concepts. For example, the concepts CONTAINER, 
SUBSTANCE and OBJECT are related because human beings are predisposed to 
experience their bodies as a container, with an inside and outside, that is made up of 
bodily substances, such as bones and blood. For example, the metaphor “Mary fell in 
love” conceptualises the person (in this case Mary) as a substance that enters the 
container (in this case love), reflecting the BODY AS A CONTAINER FOR 
EMOTIONS schema. Other concepts that are grounded in sensorimotor experiences 
are related to metaphorical schemas that follow spatial orientations (e.g., MORE IS 
UP, LESS IS DOWN) and motion (e.g., TIME IS MOTION). 
Criticism of CMT 
CMT has received a range of criticism. One problem consistently noted is that the 
identification of metaphors is largely unsystematic and depends on the researchers’ 
intuition (Kövecses, 2008; Pragglejaz, 2007). Some metaphorical expressions remain 
unnoticed, meaning that the target domains that underpin these metaphorical 
expressions also remain unidentified (Kövecses, 2008). Researchers also differ in 
their theoretical orientations and criteria for metaphor identification, influencing their 
decision-making in classifying conventional expressions as instances of metaphorical 
or non-metaphorical expressions (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). The lack of agreed-upon 
criteria also prevents the establishment of a scientific framework for quantitatively 
assessing and comparing the occurrence of metaphorical schemas in spoken and 
 




written discourses (Kövecses, 2008; Pragglejaz Group, 2007). Most importantly, the 
lack of a systematic approach to metaphor analysis tends to produce cyclic arguments, 
rendering CMT unfalsifiable and, thereby, unscientific (Haser, 2005; Kertész & 
Rákosi, 2009; Pragglejaz, 2007). 
 
Another point of criticism is that conceptual metaphors differ in their levels of 
schematicity. Indeed, Kövecses (2008, p. 174) posits that the conceptual metaphor 
schema THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS can be mapped onto “The theory has a solid 
foundation” but that the level of schematicity of this schema cannot be generalised to 
“The theory has a corridor”. In this sense, Kövecses (2008, p. 175) argues that it is 
necessary to establish an appropriate level of schematicity in order to identify those 
elements of the source domain that map realistically onto the target domain. Lakoff 
and Johnson’s (1980) CMT has been also widely criticised because it presents the 
relationship of embodiment and image schemas as universal experiences without 
acknowledging the cultural differences that influence the mind-body connection. 
Therefore, CMT has been perceived as reductionistic due to its lack of accountability 
for the cross-cultural variations of conceptualised bodily experiences (Rakova, 2003). 
In fact, cognitive linguists have provided great insight into the cultural differences 
that mediate the relationship between the body and cognitive processes, and into the 
ways in which these cultural variations are expressed in the use of metaphors (e.g., 
Maalej & Yu, 2011).  
 
Pertaining to the psychodynamic theory underpinning the body boundary concept, 
scholars have also pointed out that cognitive science has incorporated fundamental 
psychoanalytic concepts without acknowledging their source (Bucci, 2000; Holland, 
1998; Fónagy, 2001). Holland (1998) argues that cognitive linguistics and metaphor 
theory’s central idea of a cognitive science of conceptual metaphor shows strong 
similarities to the writings of Ella Freeman Sharpe (1937, 1940). For example, 
Lakoff’s (1996) analysis of US political parties by differentiating between the 
conservative as representing the strict father image and the liberal representing a 
nurturing mother image resembles psychoanalytic conceptualisations. Similarly, 
Lakoff’s (1993) analysis of dreams through the use of metaphoric mappings and 
image schemas to explore the dreamer’s anxieties makes use of psychoanalytic 
symbolism, such as WORLDLY POWER IS SEXUAL POWER. Also, CMT’s 
assumption that metaphors are grounded in bodily experiences echoes the Freudian 
psychoanalytic notion, which positions the body as a central concept for describing 
and explaining the functional and dysfunctional development of the self in human 
beings (Freud, 1905; 1923). From this context, Holland proposes that CMT aligns 
with the psychoanalytic idea that unconscious and conscious thinking are interwoven 
processes and thus diffuse the idea of an “objective reality” and “literal truth”. Despite 
the fact that CMT does not differentiate between two levels of consciousness (i.e., the 
conscious and unconscious), Fónagy (2001, p. 357) points out that Johnson (1987) 
compared the system of metaphorical thought to a net of channels, which implies the 
existence of different levels of consciousness that canalise the mapping processes of 
metaphorical image schemas.  
Aims of this Study 
By drawing on Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980) container schema, this study aims to 
explore the use of semantic fields related to container-schematic imagery in the 
 




narratives of everyday memories and of dream memories in High and Low Barrier 
personalities. Taking into consideration Fisher and Cleveland’s exterior-interior 
model of body boundary awareness and Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) in-out orientation 
of container-schematic conceptualisations, it can be stated that if an increased use of 
the semantic fields that represent concrete and metaphorical container-schematic 
imagery were to be found in the narratives of High Barrier personalities compared to 
Low Barrier personalities, this result would support the proposition that the referential 
system which coordinates sense impressions and organises our mental representations 
differs between the barrier personality types. Such an increased frequency of semantic 
fields representing concrete and metaphorical container-schematic conceptualisations 
of objects and entities indicates an individual basis that underpins the tendency in 
humans to conceptualise and quantify the properties of their surroundings through the 
use of container-schematic perceptions. As heightened levels of primordial mental 
activity have been associated with an increase in use of metaphorical language (Freud, 
1900), this study also aims to explore how High and Low Barrier personalities use 
metaphorical expressions differently in narratives of everyday memories and of dream 
memories. In particular, previous literature has identified that Low Barrier 
personalities showed more frequent instances of expressing their thoughts and 
emotions directly, whereas High Barrier personalities communicated their emotions 
and thoughts less often (Cariola, 2015). From this context, it is possible to infer that 
High Barrier personalities communicate their thoughts and emotions through the use 
of metaphorical expressions more frequently than Low Barrier personalities.   
Hypotheses 
Given that the barrier imagery related to semantic content describes the shielding and 
protective features of objects, the first hypothesis (H1) predicts that the narratives in 
the autobiographical memories of High Barrier personalities will use more semantic 
fields related to concrete container-like objects, such as ‘Vehicles and transport on 
land’, ‘Architecture and buildings’ and references related to ‘Clothes and personal 
belongings’.  
 
The second hypothesis (H2) further predicts that High Barrier personalities will use 
more semantic fields that indicate a container-schematic conceptualisation of entities 
that are not characterised by a visual external boundary or surface.  
 
The third hypothesis (H3) predicts that the narratives of High Barrier personalities 
will use higher frequencies of semantic fields related to primordial mental activity, 
such as perceptual process (e.g., ‘Sensory sight’), spatial references and relativity 
(e.g., ‘Shape’) and bodily processes (e.g., ‘Anatomy and physiology’).  
 
In contrast, the fourth hypothesis (H4) predicts that Low Barrier personalities will use 
higher frequencies of the semantic fields related to conceptual thought, such as 
cognitive processes (e.g., ‘Thought and belief’) and affective processes (e.g., ‘General 
Emotions’, ‘Happy’ and ‘Sad’).  
 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) suggests that High Barrier personalities will have an 
increased tendency to communicate emotions indirectly through the use of 
metaphorical expressions, compared to Low Barrier personalities. 
 





Participants and Data  
The data were based on responses of 330 female and 158 male participants with a 
mean age of 25.59 years old (SD=10.65) with a range of 18-63 years. The data 
obtained for this study were based on a corpus of everyday memories (N=488) and 
dream memories (N=450). The narratives for everyday memories (N=488) had a text 
length of 71,831 words with a mean of 147.19 words per response (SD=97.27). The 
narratives of dream memories (N=450) had a text length of 62,005 words with a mean 
of 137.79 words per response (SD =125.16). 
Procedure 
An online survey was produced and distributed to undergraduate and graduate 
students. The study’s online questionnaire included an initial briefing that outlined the 
purpose of the research project. Once the participants decided to take part in the 
experiment, they disclosed their demographic information, including gender, age, and 
native language. Then, the participants were asked to write a narrative about a recent 
everyday experience —“Please think about a recent personal event. Write about this 
past event, in the box below, as you would describe it to a person or a good friend in 
a real-life situation” — and a recent nocturnal dream — “Please think about a recent 
nocturnal dream. Write about this dream, in the box below, as you would describe it 
to a person or a good friend in a real-life situation”. At the end of the experiment, the 
participants were thanked and were provided with a debriefing that explained the 
purpose of the study. The study received full ethical approval from the Ethics 
Committee at Lancaster University in Lancashire, UK. All verbal responses were 
manually checked for correct spelling and were spell-checked using the Microsoft 
Word Spelling and Grammar tool. Due to the technical restrictions of the PROTAN 
content analysis software (Hogenraad, Daubies, Bestgen, & Mahau, 2003), brackets, 
hyphens, and dashes were deleted from the corpus texts. Apostrophes used in 
contractions (i.e., negations and personal pronouns with auxiliary verbs) were 
substituted with the original grammatical forms, whereas apostrophes that marked the 
possessive case were deleted. 
Classification of Barrier Personalities 
The Body Type Dictionary (BTD) (Wilson, 2006) was applied to the narratives of 
everyday memories (N=488) and to the narratives of dream memories (N=450). The 
BTD is a content analysis dictionary that, in conjunction with a content analysis 
software program, identifies and calculates the frequency of lexical items that are 
classified as barrier imagery and penetration imagery. The BTD is conceptually based 
on Fisher and Cleveland’s (1958) manual scoring system of High and Low Barrier 
personalities. The BTD contains 551 entries for barrier imagery, 231 entries for 
penetration imagery, and 70 exception words that prevent the erroneous matching of 
ambiguous word stems, all of which are assigned to 12 semantic categories (Wilson, 
2006).  
 
For the computerised content analysis, the BTD was applied to the narratives using 
the PROTAN content analysis software program, which measures occurrences of 
category-based lexical content in texts (Hogenraad et al., 2003). A lemmatisation 
process was then applied to reduce inflected words to their base forms. For example, 
 




“agrees, agreed, agreeing” were all reduced to “agree”. Subsequently, the lexical 
content of the segmented and reduced texts was matched against the BTD categories. 
The frequency rate used in this study for both linguistic and grammatical variables 




The median range for the barrier imagery frequency in each memory type was used to 
divide the narratives of everyday and dream memories into two equivalent parts. 
Barrier scores less than the median values were categorised as ‘Low Barrier 
personalities’, whereas Barrier scores greater than the median values were categorised 
as ‘High Barrier personalities.’  
 
Descriptive statistics revealed that the narratives for everyday memories had a 
frequency rate mean of 2.20 and a frequency rate median of 2.43 (SD=2.18), whereas 
those for dream memories had a frequency rate mean of 3.29 and a frequency rate 
median of 3.75 (SD=2.45). The BTD has been shown to have high inter-rater and 
inter-method reliability in relation to Fisher and Cleveland’s (1956, 1958) manual 
scoring system, and correlation validity with primordial thought language (Cariola, 
2014, a,b). 
 
After the data were divided into two equal parts, the Low Barrier personalities 
(N=244) had a frequency rate mean of .34 (SD=.75) and the High Barrier 
personalities (N=244) had a mean of 4.10 (SD=1.31) for the Barrier frequencies in the 
narratives of everyday memories.  The Low Barrier personalities (N=225) had a mean 
of 1.30 (SD=1.55) and the High Barrier personalities (N=225) had a mean of 5.29 
(SD=1.24) for the Barrier frequencies in the narratives of dream memories (see Tables 
22 and 23). 
Semantic Field Annotation 
The USAS tagger (UCREL2 Semantic Annotation Tool) (Rayson et al., 2004) of the 
web-based semantic annotation software WMatrix (Rayson, 2008) was applied to the 
narratives of everyday memories and of dream memories to match the words and 
multi-word expressions with pre-defined semantic field tags. The USAS’s tag set 
comprises 21 major discourse fields that are divided into 332 categories, based on 
approximately 37,000 words and 16,000 multi-word units (Archer, Wilson, & 
Rayson, 2002; Piao, Rayson, Murdaya, Wilson, & Garside, 2006). The USAS 
semantic tagger is assumed to have a categorisation accuracy of 91 to 92 per cent 
(Rayson et al., 2004). In relation to this study, a log-likelihood statistic at a 0.001 
significance level with a LL cut-off value of 6.63 was applied to indicate the over- or 
under-use of 65 USAS tags. Due to the relatively large number of over- and under-
used key semantic fields in the comparison of the autobiographical memories between 
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the High and Low Barrier personalities, the analysis was limited to the twenty most 
frequently occurring semantic fields. 
Corpus-Based Metaphor Analysis 
To answer the fifth hypothesis, the USAS tagger was applied to analyse the figurative 
language used, including metaphor and metonymy. The application of the USAS tool 
to the identification of significantly over- and under- used semantic fields after 
comparing the two texts (i.e., the research and reference corpus) has been proposed as 
an automatic course for the analysis of figurative language (Koller, Hardie, Rayson, & 
Semino, 2008). By referring to a conceptual metaphorical framework (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987), the ‘source’ and ‘target’ domains of the conceptual 
metaphors have been suggested to correspond approximately to the pre-defined 
semantic fields of the USAS tagger. This identification of ‘semantic’ fields then 
enables potential metaphorical language usage (Semino et al., 2005). The USAS 
tagger also produces lists that show the frequencies of the semantic tags based on 
word and multi-word expressions in each semantic field for both data sets (i.e., the 
research and reference text). A closer exploration of these words and multi-word 
expressions enables the identification of any potential ‘source’ domains in greater 
detail, while providing further information about whether the words and multi-word 
expressions that inform semantic fields in one dataset are high or low keyness 
compared to another. Subsequently, concordance analysis enables the classification of 
words and multi-word expressions classified within a set of semantic fields 
conceptualised for the dataset, providing insight into the metaphorical use of extracted 
potential ‘source’ domains. As stated by Koller and colleagues (2008, p. 142), this 
metaphorical analysis has been largely criticised for lacking a coherent empirical 
framework (e.g., Steen, 1999; Cameron, 2003; Deignan, 2005). The development of 
an automated annotation procedure for metaphorical analysis represents a promising 
empirical procedure for the identification of ‘source’ and ‘target’ domains compared 
to manual metaphor annotation.  
Identification of Metaphors and Figurative Expression 
The identification of figurative language use was based on the Metaphor 
Identification Procedure (MIP) as proposed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007). The MIP 
represents a systematic procedure for identifying metaphors. Based on the MIP, a 
lexical unit is classified as a metaphorical expression when its contextual meaning is 
incongruent with the basic meaning associated with the same lexical unit. The basic 
meaning of a lexical unit is sourced from a dictionary, such as the OED, which can be 
then compared with the contextual meaning of the lexical unit as it occurs in the 
phrase. To assess the reliability of the MIP, six independent coders using the MIP to 
identify metaphors in two data sets (i.e., conversations and newspaper text) 
demonstrated an overall modest reliability in identifying metaphors using the MIP. 
The MIP outlines the following procedural steps for identifying metaphors and 
figurative expressions (p. 3) 
 
1. Read the entire text–discourse to establish a general understanding of the 
meaning. 
2. Determine the lexical units in the text–discourse. 
3. (a) For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, that is, 
how it applies to an entity, relation, or attribute in the situation evoked by the 
 




text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the 
lexical unit. 
(b) For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning 
in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic 
meanings tend to be: 
 
• More concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, 
smell, and taste. 
• Related to bodily action. 
• More precise (as opposed to vague) 
• Historically older. 
Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the 
lexical unit. 
(c) If the lexical unit has a more basic current–contemporary meaning in other 
contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts 
with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it. 
4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 2014) (http://www.oed.com) was used to 
identify the basic meaning of words. The OED is a standard dictionary of the English 
language that provides the meaning and pronunciation of over 600,000 words. The 
OED also provides the historical meanings of words, and is regularly updated and 
revised according to contemporary developments in the English language.  
Further Statistical Analysis  
A Z-test of proportions for independent populations was used to assess significant 
differences in use of figurative expressions between High and Low Barrier 
personalities in the narratives of everyday and dream memories.  
Results  
The over- and under- used semantic discourse fields in the narratives of everyday 
memories and of dream memories in Low and High Barrier personalities can be seen 
in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
 
H1. Consistent with the first hypothesis (H1), High Barrier personalities had a high 
keyness of semantic fields that were perceptually grounded to the container schema 
with enclosed or partially enclosed objects and a material boundary that separated the 
interior from the exterior (Johnson, 1987). The semantic fields that were relevant to 
the container schema in narratives of everyday memories and of dream memories 
included: ‘Vehicles and transport on land’ (e.g., car, train, cars), ‘Clothes and 
personal belongings’ (e.g., bag, shoe, pocket), ‘Architecture, house and buildings’ 
(e.g., house, flat, building). Related narratives of everyday memories also included the 
semantic field: ‘Residence’ (e.g., hotel, house), ‘Sailing, swimming, etc.’ (e.g., boat, 
boats, ship), and ‘Parts of buildings’ (e.g., room, roof).  
 
High Barrier personalities’ narratives of the dream memories, compared to those of 
Low Barrier personalities, had a high keyness of the semantic fields ‘Furniture and 
household fittings’ (e.g., bed, sofa, table) and ‘The Media: Books’ (e.g., library, book, 
books). These terms comprise container schematic lexical items that can also be 
 




classified as barrier imagery, such as ‘carpet’, as well as, in relation to the latter, 
‘library’ and ‘book’. High Barrier personalities’ narratives of dream memories also 
had a high keyness of the semantic field ‘Geographical terms’, which comprises 
lexical items grounded in container schematic concepts with clearly defined 
boundaries, such as ‘sea’, ‘river’, and ‘cave’. 
 
Given the increased perceptual focus on surfaces in High Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of everyday memories, the high keyness of the semantic field ‘Living 
creatures: animals, birds, etc.’ contained, if also infrequently, lexical items that 
denoted animals, which are classified as barrier imagery due to the animals’ 
“distinctive or unusual skin” (Fisher & Cleveland, 1958, p. 59). These include stripes 
and structured surfaces (e.g., sheep). An increased focus on surfaces in High Barrier 
personalities was also evident in the high keyness of the semantic fields ‘Colour and 
colour patterns’ and ‘Substances and materials: Liquid’, which are often, but not 
exclusively, related to the description of the solid and textured surface materials (e.g., 
wood, glass, iron) of container objects (e.g., “The cardboard box”). 
 
H2. Consistent with the second hypothesis (H2), the results also showed High Barrier 
personalities’ perceptual focus on the metaphorical boundaries and containing 
qualities of entities. For example, High Barrier personalities’ narratives of everyday 
memories had a high keyness of the semantic field ‘Geographical names’, which 
comprises lexical items that denote the place names of cities (e.g., London, Norwich, 
Aberdeen), countries (e.g., Italy, Uganda, New Zealand) and adjectives with cultural 
references (e.g., British, Irish, Arabian). These place names and cultural attributes are 
often conceptualised within a container schema in relation to geographically 
negotiated and bounded territories. For example, the boundaries of a country are often 
designated through a coloured line drawn on a map. High Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of everyday memories also had an increased frequency of the semantic field 
‘Time: Beginning’ (e.g., started, start, began), which conceptualises time in the form 
of a definite temporal boundary of an action or entity (e.g., “The funeral started with 
a Catholic mass”). The conceptualisation of time as a bounded entity corresponds to 
symbolic perception of container boundaries of non-material entities, compared to 
material entities that are defined by a physical boundary. 
 
In narratives of dream memories, High Barrier personalities had a higher keyness of 
the semantic fields ‘Personal names’ and ‘Kin’ compared to Low Barrier 
personalities. ‘Personal names’ typically denotes the identity of a person (or animal), 
and implies unique qualities due to their personality and the unique visual appearance 
and recognisability of their bodily exterior (e.g., “I met Albert Einstein”). The 
semantic field ‘kin’ (e.g., mum, family, father) contains those lexical items that 
communicate an associated degree of kinship of family members (e.g., “My mum was 
stood”). Kinship represents a group entity that is defined by its emotional attachments 
and shared genetics; thus, this entity is differentiated from other social groups and 
relationships. In this context, the high frequency of references to kinship echoes the 
High Barriers’ tendency to emphasise group membership (Cariola, 2015). Kinship has 
also been anthropologically associated with nurturing and protection against 
individuals who are not kin (Murphy, 2008). In contrast, Low Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of everyday memories had a high keyness of the semantic field related to 
general social interactions, including ‘Personal relationship: general’ (e.g., friends, 
friend, met), ‘Participating’ (e.g., met up, meeting, attended) and ‘Giving’ (e.g., gave, 
 




give, given), rather than family relationships. Notably, Low Barrier personalities 
made significantly more references to ‘friend/s’ (117) compared to High Barrier 
personalities (95), Z = 2.01, p < .05. This preference of Low Barrier personalities for 
mentioning friends in their narratives of everyday memories might be indicative of the 
supportive role friendships play in their lives as a possible substitute for a less 
supportive family environment, compared to High Barrier personalities, who are 
typically characterised by a supportive family (Fisher & Cleveland, 1958). Within this 
line of thought, the narratives of dream memories of Low Barrier personalities also 
had a high keyness for the semantic field ‘Relationship: Intimacy and sex’ (e.g., 
boyfriend, girlfriend, sexually), emphasising intimate personal relationships and 
experiences. 
 
Security related concerns are also expressed in the high keyness of the semantic field 
‘Law and order’ (e.g., security, police, prisoner) in High Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of dream memories, which comprise those lexical items that characterise 
security-related concepts and the confinement and restriction of movement (e.g., 
“they arrested Beth”), along with the increased use of inhibition words, as identified 
in Study 2 (6.2). 
 
H3. The results identified that the narratives of High Barrier personalities involving 
everyday memories had a high keyness of semantic fields reflecting primordial mental 
activity, such as sensory perception, spatial and motion references, thus confirming 
the third hypothesis (H3). For example, memories of everyday memories had a high 
keyness of semantic fields relevant to sensory perceptions, such as ‘Sensory: Sight’ 
(e.g., see, saw, seen), ‘Light’ (e.g., light, lightening, lights) and ‘Seen’ (e.g., noticed, 
notice, looked out), which in narratives of dream memories referred to the processes 
of observation, for example “I suddenly noticed a girl running across the tracks”). 
There was also a high keyness of semantic fields associated with spatial and motion 
references, including ‘Location and direction’ (e.g., there, this, where), ‘Moving, 
coming and going’ (e.g., went, go left) and ‘Putting, pulling, pushing, transporting’ 
(e.g., put, moved, picked up). The inflation of spatial and motion references was also 
evident in High Barrier personalities’ narratives of dream memories, (i.e., ‘Location 
and direction’); however, the results suggest that the spatial and motion references in 
dream narratives are primarily conceptualised through the ascertainment of size, 
amount and degree, as indicated by the semantic fields ‘Measurement: Size’ (e.g., 
size, fit, sized), ‘Measurement: Length & height’ (e.g., in, heights, level) and ‘Speed: 
Fast’ (e.g., faster, quicker).  
 
H4. Mainly consistent with the fourth hypothesis (H4), Low Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of everyday and dream memories had a higher keyness of semantic fields 
related to conceptual thoughts, compared to the narratives of High Barrier 
personalities.  
 
Given the assumption of the inflation of cognitive processes with conceptual thought 
(Robbins, 2011), the results showed an inflation of semantic fields associated with 
cognitive processes, such as ‘Knowledgeable’ (e.g., know, knew, remember), and 
‘Learning’ (e.g., found out, find out, learnt) in Low Barrier personalities’ narratives of 
everyday memories. In particular, the semantic field ‘Negative’ (e.g., not, no, nothing) 
indicated the presence of discriminating thoughts. Although their cognitive processes 
of everyday memories emphasised knowledge, cognitive insights and discriminative 
 




thought, Low Barrier personalities’ narratives of dream memories further reflected a 
high keyness of those semantic fields that comprise lexical items specific to the recall 
of dream events, such as ‘Inattentive’ (e.g., in dream, ignored, disregarding), ‘Mental 
actions and processes’ (e.g., dreamt, dream, dreaming), and ‘Mental object: 
Conceptual object’ (e.g., dream, dreams, nightmare). These lexical items indicate that 
the recalled event was a dream and its consequences would represent “no physical 
real-life effect on the real ‘I’, other than an emotional impact, since dreams indicate 
creative imaginary acts” (Cariola, 2008, p. 20). 
 
Low Barrier personalities also used more semantic fields related to the evaluation of 
event states in both narrative types. For example, the narratives of everyday memories 
had an inflated keyness of the semantic fields ‘Evaluation: True’ (e.g., fact, in fact, be 
the case) ‘Existing’ (e.g., was, is, be) and ‘Exceed; waste’  (e.g., too, too much, over), 
whereas the narratives of dream memories had an increased use of ‘Evaluation: 
Good’ (e.g., best, absolute, perfect) and ‘Evaluation: Inaccurate’ (e.g., wrong, 
missing, missed). Evaluations typically indicate the remembering subject’s personal 
involvement and attitude towards the narrative event by emphasising the importance 
of certain narrative aspects (e.g., “he was too clingy anyway”) and via commentary 
on the accuracy of the recalled details (e.g., “And I know for a fact that it was not 
due”). Such an increased focus on the evaluation and truthfulness of memory events 
is consistent with semantic usage, relating to Pennebaker and King’s (1999) factor 
level of ‘making distinctions’. It suggests that the production of autobiographical 
memories by Low Barrier personalities might be perceived as more factually reliable 
than the narratives of High Barrier personalities, which reflect a more creative and 
socially engaging narrative style (Cariola, 2015).  
 
The narratives of both everyday and dream memories of Low Barrier personalities 
also had an increased keyness of the semantic field ‘Thought, belief’ (e.g., think, felt, 
feel), which included the expression of their thought processes (e.g., “I do not think 
Craig told anyone”) and feeling states (e.g., “I felt bad that I had so enjoyed the 
evening”). Although the narratives of everyday memories did not show a high 
keyness of semantic fields related to emotions, narratives of dream memories showed 
an inflated keyness of the semantic fields associated with the expression of various 
emotional states, such as ‘Sad’ (e.g., upset, crying, sad), ‘Happy’ (e.g., happy, funny, 
laughed) and ‘Like’ (e.g., like, loved, fancied). 
 
Taking into consideration that dream states typically have a higher level of primordial 
mental activity compared to everyday consciousness (Freud, 1900), Low Barrier 
personalities’ narratives of dream memories also featured a high keyness of semantic 
fields associated with relativity, such as spatiality and physiological references, which 
is typically representative of primordial mental activity (Robbins, 2011). For example, 
the spatial semantic field ‘Distance: Near’ (e.g., closer) is related to the expression of 
an observed motion situated in the dream memory (e.g., “the wolf was getting closer 
and closer”). There was also a high keyness of the semantic fields ‘Time: Present: 
simultaneous’ (e.g., now, at this point, yet) and ‘Distance: Near’ (e.g., closer), both of 
which emphasise the relationship between the recalled dream events and the person’s 
real life (e.g., “the guy I am currently seeing was cheating on me”) and also express a 
sense of the immediate vividness of a dream event (e.g., “I was now on the other 
side”). In this sense, Low Barrier personalities used temporal references literally, 
whereas, as shown above in relation to the semantic field, ‘Time: beginning’, High 
 




Barrier personalities used temporal references as a container-schematic bounded 
entity.  
 
H5. The results identified that High Barrier personalities used slightly more but also 
different embodied expressions of human emotions than Low Barrier personalities, 
thus partly confirming the fifth hypothesis (H5). Cognitive linguistics has consistently 
demonstrated that internal and external bodily parts are often used metaphorically as a 
means to conceptualise human cognition, spanning emotions, personality traits, 
cultural values and mental faculties (Gibbs, 2006; Ziemke, Zlatev, & Frank, 2007). 
For example, the human heart is typically perceived as representing the centre of 
human emotions and feelings, compared to the head, which is seen as the centre of 
thoughts and the mind in the British-English speaking culture (Sharifian, Dirven, Yu, 
& Niedermeier, 2008).  
 
In this context, the results identified that the semantic item ‘heart’ in the semantic 
field ‘Anatomy and physiology’ 3  was used eight times as a source domain to 
figuratively express the emotions in High Barrier personalities’ narratives of everyday 
and dream memories. For example, the emotion of sadness was expressed via 
conventional idioms (i.e., “It was heart breaking”) and a vertical metaphor DOWN 
IS BAD schema (e.g., “My heart sinks”). However, the emotion of fear was 
communicated in the form of a local displacement of the heart (e.g., “I could feel my 
heart in my mouth”). The ‘heart’ was also conceptualised as PART FOR WHOLE 
metonymy by attributing to the human heart the anthropomorphic quality HEART IS 
A HUMAN BEING, such as “my heart cries”. In contrast, among Low Barrier 
personalities, the ‘heart’ was used figuratively in only one instance as a means to 
express the affectionate personality of another individual (i.e., “caring heart”). 
According to Fisher (1970, p. 481), an increased awareness of the heart has been 
shown to relate to sociability and friendly interactions with others, echoing the social 
and outgoing nature of the High Barrier personality. Low Barrier personalities showed 
an increased use of source domains related to the idiomatic expressions of ‘face’ to 
convey emotions in narratives of everyday memories, whereas High Barrier 
personalities did not use ‘face’ in figurative expressions. For example, Low Barrier 
personalities referred to the ‘face’ to express the emotion of courage, or lack of fear, 
by combining the metonymic FACE IS SEEING schema with the metaphorical 
schema SEEING IS CONFRONTING, such as “to face all the aspects of my 
personality” and “she could not face it alone”, and the idiomatic expression “to keep 
a brave face”.  
 
Emotions were also indirectly expressed by High Barrier personalities in relation to 
the semantic field ‘Architecture, houses and buildings’. High Barrier personalities’ 
                                                
3	In	the	semantic	field	‘Anatomy	and	physiology’,	the	semantic	item	‘back’	was	the	
most	 frequently	 used	 word;	 however,	 its	 denotative	 meaning	 was	 related	
predominantly	to	the	concept	of	“coming	back,	returning”	(e.g.,	“when	I	am	living	
back	 in	 halls	 next	 year”)	 or	 “situated	 behind	 or	 in	 the	 rear,	 or	 away	 from	 the	
front”	 (e.g.,	 “and	my	 back	window	 is	 also	 leaking”)	 rather	 than	 relating	 to	 “the	
hinder	surface	of	the	body,	that	which	is	opposite	to	the	front	or	face,	and	which	
is	 turned	 upon	 those	 who	 are	 left	 behind”	 (OED,	 2014).	 This	 example	
demonstrates	 the	 lack	 of	 context-dependent	 sensitivity	 of	 computerised	
semantic	tagging	to	disambiguate	homonymous	and	homographs.	
 




narratives of everyday memories used the word stem ‘build’ to express emotions and 
physical states (e.g., “the excitement was building”) and to describe the development 
of human relationships through the use of EMOTIONS, PHYSICAL HEALTH and 
RELATIONSHIPS ARE STRUCTURES schema (e.g., “we had really built up some 
kind of rapport”). In narratives of dream memories, these word stems were not used 
figuratively; however, the architectural imagery related to the semantic field ‘Parts of 
buildings’ was depicted as damaged and destroyed in High Barrier personalities’ 
narratives of dream memories (e.g., “bits of the roof were missing”). In High 
Barriers’ narratives of everyday memories, however, they did not mention the 
condition of the parts of buildings (e.g., “The views from the roof were amazing“). 
High Barrier personalities also had a high keyness of the semantic field ‘Damaging 
and destroying’ (e.g., crashing, crash, broken) in relation with architectural features 
(e.g., “a few of us living in this ruin of a castle”) and anatomical bodily parts (e.g., “I 
had broken my foot again”) in their recall of dream memories.  
 
Although these expressions were used predominantly literally, the complete or partial 
destruction of objects and bodily parts also evoke feelings of loss or physical pain in 
the hearer, thus communicating negative emotions (Bowlby, 1980). Given High 
Barrier personalities’ increased group focus, the use of imagery that expresses 
negative emotions through the use of destructive imagery further enabled them to 
elicit empathic and supportive responses from the environment. In particular, the 
ability to simulate the experiences, events, feelings, and emotions of others represents 
the foundation of social identification and the notion of a social ‘we-ness’ (Gallese, 
2009). Out of this context, the sharing of destructive imagery in the narratives of 
dream memories, as an indirect expression of negative emotions, might be related to 
the High Barrier’s increased ability to simulate other internal states while grounding 
their communicative content on embodied simulation designed to elicit socially 
empathic responses and social identification. These simulations rely on “implicit and 
prelinguistic mechanisms of the embodied simulation-driven mirroring mechanisms” 
(Gallese, 2009, p. 519). This strategy is consistent with the High Barriers’ socially 
orientated personalities. Conversely, High Barrier personalities also use references 
related to the destruction or damage of objects in order to infuse their dream narrative 
with drama. In this way, they call on the listener’s ability to embody simulation as a 
means of increasing the attentive and affective involvement of the listener (e.g., “the 
sound of the wild waves crashing in my ears”). High Barrier personalities had a 
higher keyness of the semantic field ‘Judgment of appearance: Beautiful’ (e.g., nice, 
lovely, amazing) in the narratives of everyday memories, which also contained lexical 
items describing favourable perception of objects, individuals and events (e.g., 
amazing, nice, lovely), such as “the views from the roof were amazing” or “it was 
lovely to pretend”. These semantic tags are associated with a positive affective tone 
that produces positive emotions in the communicative recipient (Bradley & Lang, 












Table 1.  Frequencies (O) and log-likelihood values (LL) of over-used semantic fields 
in narratives of everyday memories of High Barrier personalities compared to Low 
Barrier personalities. 
 
 High Barrier Low Barrier  
Semantic Field O1 % O2 % LL 
Vehicles and transport on land  234 0.68 39 0.12 141.93 
Clothes and personal belongings  129 0.37 8 0.02 121.09 
Moving, coming and going 801 2.32 480 1.48 61.46 
Architecture, house and buildings  89 0.26 16 0.05 51.21 
Parts of buildings  114 0.33 33 0.10 42.02 
Anatomy and physiology  356 1.03 195 0.60 37.68 
Living creatures: animals, birds, etc.  120 0.35 40 0.12 36.74 
Residence  130 0.38 51 0.16 30.64 
Plants  57 0.16 13 0.04 27.01 
Putting, pulling, pushing, 
transporting 
231 0.67 124 0.38 26.06 
Colour and colour patterns 71 0.21 23 0.07 22.63 
Judgement of appearance: Beautiful 129 0.37 59 0.18 22.27 
Geographical names 154 0.45 76 0.24 22.07 
Substances and materials: Liquid 33 0.10 6 0.02 18.83 
Sensory: Sight 220 0.64 129 0.40 18.36 
Sailing, swimming, etc. 37 0.11 9 0.03 16.49 
Grammatical bin 9,893 28.63 8,728 26.99 16.21 
Location and direction 520 1.51 377 1.17 14.41 
Time: Beginning 107 0.31 55 0.17 13.73 
Substances and materials: Solid 43 0.12 14 0.08 13.61 
 
Table 2.  Frequencies (O) and log-likelihood values (LL) of over-used semantic fields 
in narratives of dream memories of High Barrier personalities compared to Low 
Barrier personalities. 
 
 High Barrier Low Barrier  
Semantic Fields O1 % O2 % LL 
Parts of buildings  384 1.18 103 0.40 115.19 
Architecture, houses and buildings 243 0.75 42 0.16 114.89 
Vehicles and transport on land 194 0.60 72 0.28 33.88 
Clothes and personal belongings 150 0.46 53 0.20 28.93 
Location and direction 698 2.15 400 1.54 28.46 
Personal names 165 0.51 65 0.25 25.26 
Moving, coming and going 802 2.47 497 1.92 19.83 
Grammatical bin 9,962 30.66 7,487 28.90 14.98 
Kin 225 0.69 118 0.46 14.10 
Geographical terms 127 0.39 57 0.22 13.81 
Light 37 0.11 9 0.03 12.54 
Law and order 34 0.10 8 0.03 11.97 
Measurement: Size 15 0.05 1 0.00 11.73 
The Media: Books 31 0.10 7 0.03 11.42 
Seen 33 0.10 8 0.03 11.23 
Measurement: Length & height 17 0.05 2 0.01 10.40 
Damaging and destroying 65 0.20 26 0.10 9.60 
Furniture and household fittings 102 0.31 48 0.19 9.57 
Speed: Fast 8 0.02 0 0.00 9.38 
Sailing, swimming, etc. 56 0.17 22 0.08 8.63 
 
 




Table 3.  Frequencies (O) and log-likelihood values (LL) of under-used semantic 
fields in narratives of everyday memories of High Barrier personalities compared to 
Low Barrier personalities. 
 
 High Barrier Low Barrier  
Semantic Field O1 % O2 % LL 
Pronouns 5,852 16.94 6,135 18.97 38.55 
Negative 478 1.38 623 1.93 29.96 
Thought, belief 265 0.77 377 1.17 27.76 
Speech: Communication 286 0.83 389 1.20 23.34 
Knowledgeable 162 0.47 226 0.70 15.27 
Existing 1,223 3.54 1,334 4.13 14.97 
Evaluation: True 9 0.03 30 0.09 13.36 
Speech acts 196 0.57 258 0.80 13.10 
Wanted 128 0.37 181 0.56 12.98 
Personal relationship: general 153 0.44 204 0.63 11.08 
The Media: Newspapers etc 3 0.01 16 0.05 10.65 
Learning 10 0.03 28 0.09 10.11 
Participating 21 0.06 40 0.12 7.34 
Giving 57 0.16 83 0.26 6.73 
Exceed; waste 32 0.09 53 0.16 6.73 
 
 
Table 4.  Frequencies (O) and log-likelihood values (LL) of under-used semantic 
fields in narratives of dream memories of High Barrier personalities compared to Low 
Barrier personalities.  
 
 High Barrier Low Barrier  
Semantic Field O1 % O2 % LL 
Pronouns 5,370 16.53 4,902 18.92 46.78 
Relationship: Intimacy and sex 56 0.17 106 0.41 29.08 
Mental object: Conceptual object 180 0.55 234 0.90 24.59 
Thought, belief 178 0.55 219 0.85 18.61 
Anatomy and physiology 342 1.05 362 1.40 14.11 
Sad 32 0.10 57 0.22 13.92 
Degree: Boosters 239 0.74 265 1.02 13.68 
Negative 432 1.33 440 1.70 13.04 
Happy 42 0.13 67 0.26 12.84 
Time: Present: simultaneous 51 0.16 74 0.29 11.07 
Inattentive 33 0.10 54 0.21 10.99 
Like 39 0.12 59 0.23 9.89 
Evaluation: Good 6 0.02 18 0.07 9.30 
Work and employment: Generally 38 0.12 55 0.21 8.17 
Evaluation: Inaccurate  16 0.05 30 0.12 8.09 
Distance: Near 2 0.01 10 0.04 7.79 
Mental actions and processes 76 0.23 92 0.36 7.30 
 
Discussion  
By relating the body boundary concept to the cognitive linguistic assumption that 
humans would be predisposed to view their environment in a visual in-out orientation 
due to their conscious experience of perceiving themselves as being contained by a 
skin boundary (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), this study explored the identification of the 
semantic fields related to concrete and metaphorical container-schematic imagery and 
 




the use of embodied figurative expressions of emotional states in the narratives of 
everyday and dream memories of individuals classified as High and Low Barrier 
personalities.  
 
The results demonstrated that, in both memory types, High Barrier personalities used 
more semantic fields representing concrete and metaphorical container-schematic 
imagery (Johnson, 1987), thus indicating that container metaphors might be similar to 
the Barrier personality construct. High Barrier personalities’ autobiographical 
memories also used higher frequencies of semantic fields related to primordial mental 
activity, such as bodily, sensory, motion and spatial references. Finally, High Barrier 
personalities used more semantic fields associated with space and time relations, and 
also demonstrated an increased surface awareness.  
 
These results indicate an increased tendency to structure concepts and knowledge as 
bounded and contained entities, which is consistent with Fisher and Cleveland’s 
(1958) claim that High Barrier personalities direct their visual attention to the 
boundaries and enclosing features in their environment. For example, High Barrier 
personalities’ narratives of everyday and dream memories contained more semantic 
fields related to concrete and metaphorical container schematic entities than the 
narratives of Low Barrier personalities. These narratives were also classified as 
barrier imagery, according to Fisher and Cleveland’s manual scoring system, such as 
‘Vehicles and transport on land’, ‘Clothes and personal belongings’, and 
‘Architecture, house and buildings’. High Barrier personalities used a metaphorical 
container schema to conceptualise geographical locations as geographically bounded 
territories and temporal references as definite temporal boundaries. In this sense, the 
results provided further evidence that the visual cognition of High Barrier 
personalities emphasised the surface and containing features of their natural 
environment and memory traces of dream memories to the extent that the concrete 
and metaphorical container schema represent a theoretical equivalence to the Barrier 
personality construct. 
 
Given the association between body boundary awareness and primordial mental 
activity, High Barrier personalities also used more semantic fields reflecting 
primordial mental activity in both autobiographical memory types compared to Low 
Barrier personalities, including references to somatosensory processes (‘Anatomy and 
physiology’, ‘Sensory: Sight’, ‘Light’) and spatial and motion references (e.g., 
‘Location and direction’, ‘Moving, coming and going’ and ‘Putting, pulling, pushing, 
transporting’). In contrast, Low Barrier personalities used more semantic fields 
associated with conceptual thought, including references related to cognitive 
processes (e.g., ‘Knowledgeable’, ‘Learning’, ‘Negative’), emotional states (e.g., 
‘Sad’, ‘Happy’, ‘Like’) and references indicating an increased emphasis on the 
evaluation of accuracy and truthfulness of the recalled narrative details (e.g., 
‘Evaluation: True’, ‘Exceed; waste’, ‘Evaluation: Inaccurate’). The results further 
confirm that Low Barrier personalities show an increased tendency to recall narratives 
they perceive to be factually reliable compared to the narratives of High Barrier 
personalities, which reflect a creative and socially engaging narrative style to evoke 
social responses. An indirect expression of positive and negative emotions enables the 
speakers to minimise the threat of negative social evaluations while constituting a 
politeness strategy used to gain social acceptance.  
 
 




Although the results indicated that Low Barrier personalities tended to express their 
emotions more directly, some examples were identified where High Barrier 
personalities employed embodied figurative expressions to communicate their 
emotional states. For example, the heart was used in relation to feelings of sadness 
and discontent; this act is associated with the increased socially-orientated nature of 
High Barrier personalities. In contrast, Low Barrier personalities used more references 
related to the face as a means to express feelings of courage. In narratives of dream 
memories, High Barrier personalities appeared to use imagery to evoke negative 
emotion states, such as the destruction of buildings and the injury of body parts; in so 
doing, they enabled listeners to simulate similar experiences in their own lives, as 
marked by notions of loss and physical pain that could elicit empathic and supportive 
responses. 
 
Apart from the capacity of cognitive functioning to simulate internal states, indirect 
expressions of negative emotion states may represent a politeness strategy as a means 
of avoiding disapproving and judgmental responses by the listener (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987). Given that High Barrier personalities are typically characterised as 
socially orientated, threats would represent an unfavourable outcome, with the 
potential to negotiate or jeopardise their acceptance within a social in-group. The 
indirect expression of emotions also represents an indirect speech act in the form of a 
pre-sequence on the part of the listener, who, in a conversational context, responds to 
the embedded emotive content by providing a supportive and empathic response 
consistent with sustained social involvement and conversational interest (Levinson, 
1983). In this sense, High Barrier personalities attempt to gain the approval of their 
social surroundings in a manner that mirrors their own early experiences in their 
family environment; that is, they as children adapted to their parents’ social 
expectations and conditional values of what constitutes acceptable and love-worthy 
behaviour (Fisher & Cleveland, 1958; Rogers, 1951, 1961).  
 
Based on the results of this study, it is possible to assert that the use of linguistic 
expressions that represent container schematic objects are conceptually equivalent to 
the symbolic container metaphor. However, the generalisability of the results is 
limited to the extent that it has not been established whether the use of concrete 
container imagery would also relate to the spatial conceptualisations of container 
metaphor (e.g., “Mary fell in love”). At this point, it should also be noted that the 
analysis is limited to some extent by its narrow focus on the frequencies of over- and 
under-used semantic fields. This is because it does not explore the similar patterns in 
the semantic fields of a dataset, which would provide a more complete understanding 
of the data. 
 
This study may provide insight into human behaviours associated with the Covid-19 
pandemic to the extent that the closing of borders, social distancing and lockdowns 
increased people’s immediate visual and cognitive awareness of the barrier structures 
in their immediate environment. Here the body boundary functions as a contact 
membrane that categorises the self and other individuals into social groups. Social 
categorisation and social comparison typically accentuate the perception of 
similarities and differences among group members (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 
1963). Here the exposure to barriers would lead to human behaviour associated with 
the High Barrier Personality. For example, it is not inconceivable that the imposed 
confinement during lockdown inflated awareness of one’s immediate social 
 




relationships. The conceptualisation of social groups as barrier entities was 
communicated by the UK Government using barrier imagery, including ‘social 
bubbles’, ‘childcare bubble’ and ‘support bubble’. 
 
To increase and facilitate social cohesion within a ‘bubble’, individuals would adjust 
to the needs that are common and shared by the social group, leading to a reduced 
awareness and expression of individualistic needs. As such, subjective experiences 
would be expressed indirectly, rather than directly, with the aim of ensuring social 
support and reducing the notion of threat towards the existing shared group norms and 
values. Here the alignment to social norms and reduction of threat would minimise 
rejection and most importantly arousal of social anger within the social group. This 
thought is consistent with Bachelard’s (1994) outside-inside distinction: “Beyond 
what is expressed in their formal opposition lie alienation and hostility between the 
two. And so, simple geometrical opposition becomes tinged with aggressivity. Formal 
opposition is incapable of remaining calm” (p. 212). Here the social group assumes 
an absolutist character, with its anger brewing underneath its supportive surface but 
easily erupting to punish undesirable social responses in its environment, whilst 
remaining well concealed and inhibited when it successfully suppresses individual 
expressions. It begs the question: Where is it better and safer to live, inside or 
outside? Future research should explore behaviour of High and Low Barrier 
personalities in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic, such as attitudes towards mask 
wearing and the maintenance of social distance. 
 
The use of the body boundary to define the existence of the “other” by categorically 
differentiating the self from the non-self has been also shown in political discourses. 
For example, an analysis of barrier imagery in political manifestos showed High 
Barrier political parties reflected a tendency to construct blame discourses through the 
use of  polarisation between a “good” self and a culpable “bad” other social group, 
whereas Lower Barrier political parties employ solution-focused discourses that 
recognise conflicting interests between social groups (Cariola, 2013). Based on these 
findings, it would be interesting to explore changes of group perceptions relevant to 
the Covid-19 pandemic, or other events that enforce a strong focus on barriers and 
boundaries.  
 
There are also other limitations to this study. For example, there is an overlap between 
the BTD and some USAS categories, indicating that it would to some extent be 
conceivable that High Barrier narratives would have higher frequencies of semantic 
fields associated with barrier imagery compared to narratives derived from Low 
Barrier personalities. Although there is a sense of using a data set for selection twice 
to assume a set of results, this study aimed to perform a fine-grain analysis of barrier 
imagery in relation to the container-schematic concept, by homing on the linguistic 
details that underlie the coarse-grain categorisation of the BTD frequency analysis. 
Given the technical limitations of existing lexical analysis software programmes to 
conduct a fine-grain analysis, the USAS tagger was a tool that allowed a frequency 
analysis by comparing semantic fields of two data sets as well as providing 
concordances to explore how lexical items are used in context at sentence level. As 
such, the results of this study partly confirm existing knowledge of the barrier 
imagery, and further extend the barrier imagery concept by relating it to the container-
schema derived from CMT. Future research would be able to replicate this analysis 
using semantic software that allows comparison of the lexical sub-categories of the 
 




BTD rather than using alternative software with a semantic field categorisation. 
Future research may also want to explore the relationship between the High and Low 
Barrier Personality and culture, including national, regional and perhaps even local 
characteristics pertaining to physical distance and touch. 
 
In relation to the clinical context, the body boundary construct might represent an 
alternative model to psychodynamic attachment theories (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; 
Winnicott, 1971) as put forward by Roman (2014). The development of Fisher and 
Cleveland’s (1958) body boundaries are influenced by exposure to the early familiar 
and social environment that contribute to the development of an individual’s 
attachment pattern. For example, Low Barrier Personalities experienced more neglect 
and lack of social and psychological support structures in their early familial and 
social environment compared to High Barrier personalities, thus increasing the 
possibility of the development of an insecure attachment pattern. Such early 
experiences of neglect in the Low Barrier personality may be associated with 
problematic attachment. For example, disorganised attachment relates to the complete 
absence or the collapse of functional attachment strategies, which is then associated 
with the development of dissociative disorders, including psychosis (Main & Hesse, 
1990; Liotti, 1992). The development of disorganised attachment relates to early 
interactions in which children are exposed to the caregivers’ inconsistent and erratic 
behaviour, which might mean they are frightening on some occasions, and at other 
times are available and caring.  
 
The pathological manifestations of the Low Barrier personality might also share some 
similarities with reactive attachment disorder. According to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5, American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), reactive attachment disorder is caused by parental and social neglect, such as 
the absence of adequate caregiving during childhood. It can be expressed as an 
inhibited or disinhibited type. The former type is characterised by a consistent pattern 
of autistic-like emotional withdrawn behaviour, with a reluctance to accept comfort 
and affect even from a familiar adult. The latter type is characterised by 
indiscriminate attempts to receive comfort from any available adult, including total 
strangers, which puts children at an increased risk of abuse (Love, Minnis, & 
O’Connor, 2015; Verwoort, Bosmans, Doumen, Minnis, & Verschueren, 2014).  
 
In this sense, body boundary awareness and reactive attachment behaviour represent 
dynamic models that regulate the maintenance and transgression of interpersonal and 
psychosocial boundaries. For example, as shown in previous research, the occurrence 
of reduced body boundary awareness and identity structure has been associated with 
sexual and violent offenders as well as those on the receiving end of sexual abuse 
(Leifer et al. 1991; Tardif & Van Gijseghem 2001; Weinberg et al. 2003). From a 
theoretical perspective, future research should outline in detail to what extent extreme 
manifestations that characterise the High and Low Barrier personalities relate to the 
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